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DEFECTS IN INDIANA'S PORNOGRAPHIC
NUISANCE ACT
Since the 1957 United States Supreme Court decision in Roth
v. United States," the Court has been plagued with "the intractable
obscenity problem."2 The Supreme Court has experienced difficulty in
formulating a workable definition of obscenity which successfully
balances the recognized state interest in suppressing obscene material
and the protections of the first amendment. Faced with shifting and
unclear Court standards, states have been creative in their attempts to
control the dissemination of obscene material.3 Although the Court
acknowledges the states' dilemma, it has not upheld all attempts."
After the most recent Supreme Court formulation of obscenity
standards in Miller v. California,' the constitutionality of many state
obscenity statutes is in doubt. Applying these standards, the Indiana
Supreme Court recently held two state obscenity statutes unconstitu-
tional.6 Indiana's Pornographic Nuisance Act,' now the state's sole
obscenity statute, is also likely to fail.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DEVELOPMENT OF OBSCENITY STANDARDS
In Roth the Supreme Court for the first time explicitly held that
obscenity, because it was "utterly without redeeming social importance,"
was beyond the bounds of constitutional protection.' Obscenity was to
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 2 (1970) (state board of censors) ; MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 28C-G (1968) (civil proceeding) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.380 (1949)
(search and seizure) ; OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-.11 (Page 1971) (nuisance);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 167.060-.100 (1971) (criminal proceedings, limited to distribution to
minors).
4. E.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (criminal prosecution) ; Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (state board of censors) ; Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (ex parte search warrant procedure) ; Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (license); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957) (seizure and destruction).
5. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
6. Two criminal statutes controlling distribution of obscene material were struck
down in August, 1973 in Mohney v. State, - Ind. - , 300 N.E.2d 66 (1973) and
Stroud v. State, - Ind. - , 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973). The two statutes involved
were codified at IND. CODE §§ 35-30-10-1, -3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-2803, -2803a
(1956 Repl.).
7. IND. CODE §§ 35-30-10.5-1 to -10 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-2711 to -2720
(Supp. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
8. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
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be defined by its impact on the average person.' If the fact finder, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, found that the dominant
theme of the material, viewed in its entirety, appealed to the average
person's prurient interest, it was obscene.'" However, this standard
of contemporary community standards was inconsistently applied by
the state courts." The inconsistency led the Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio
to explicitly state that "contemporary community standards" requires
use of a national rather than a local standard.
12
Nine years after Roth a plurality of the Court formulated a new
test in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. Three elements had to be present:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value.' 4
Mr. Justice Harlan thought the last element meaningless." Others have
criticized it for imposing a virtually impossible burden of proof on the
prosecution. 6
Most recently, in Miller v. California,' the Court attempted to
clarify Roth in order to define the permissible scope of state and federal
regulation. For the first time since Roth, a majority of the Justices
joined in a single obscenity opinion. Jacobellis and Memoirs were dis-
carded, and a new constitutional standard of obscenity was adopted.
9. Id. at 488-89. Previously, following the doctrine of Regina v. Hicklin, [1868]
L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, courts had determined obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, including children. But see United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
10. 354 U.S. at 488-90.
11. State v. Martin, 3 Conn. Cir. 309, - , 213 A.2d 459, 460 (1965) (national);
State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 266, 196 A.2d 225, 234-35 (1963) (na-
tional) ; People v. Brooklyn News Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817-18 (Kings County Ct.
1958) (local); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 149-50, 121 N.W.2d 545,
553 (1963) (state).
12. 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964).
13. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
14. Id. at 418.
15. Id. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. In the absence of a majority view, this Court was compelled to embark on
the practice of summarily reversing convictions for the dissemination of ma-
terials that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate tests,
found to be protected by the First Amendment .... Thirty-one cases have
been decided in this manner.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) (citation omitted).
17. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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The Court held that state regulation of obscenity must be limited to
hard core pornography, defined by the following guidelines:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."8
The most publicized of these guidelines was the adoption of local
community standards. The Miller jury was permitted to employ its
own perception of the contemporary standard of the state of California. 9
The Court held that state, rather than national, standards were adequate
because states differ in their tastes and attitudes.2" This diversity
should not be strangled by the "absolutism of imposed uniformity."
2
'
The Court also defined potentially obscene material "by its impact on
an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive
person.""
THE INDIANA PORNOGRAPHIC NUISANCE ACT
As a result of two recent Indiana Supreme Court decisions,"'
Indiana no longer has criminal obscenity statutes, except those pertain-
ing to juveniles. After remand by the United States Supreme Court
for consideration in light of Miller,24 the Indiana Supreme Court
18. Id. at 24. Dissenting in a companion case, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall, concluded that the state interest in curtailing sexually oriented
materials should be more severely restricted. The dissenters would hold that in the
absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the
first and fourteenth amendments prohibit the state and federal governments from sup-
pressing sexually oriented materials. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 413 U.S. at 30-31.
20. Id. at 33, 34. It should be noted that the Court, while upholding a statewide
standard, made no mention of more confined geographical boundaries. The Court's argu-
ments appear to also support the adoption of municipal standards, but no case yet has
decided the issue.
21. Id. at 33. The danger of suppressing protected expression may be greater in
applying a single nationwide standard than in allowing local tastes to prevail. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. 413 U.S. at 33; see note 8 supra.
23. Mohney v. State, - Ind. - , 300 N.E.2d 66 (1973) ; Stroud v. State, -
Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973).
24. Stroud v. Indiana, 413 U.S. 911 (1973); Mohney v. Indiana, 413 U.S. 911
(1973).
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unanimously held the general criminal obscenity statutes unconstitu-
tional for failing to meet the second Miller criterion requiring specifica-
tion of those acts which constitute violations.2" Although other obscen-
ity statutes may eventually be passed by the General Assembly, at present
only the 1973 Pornographic Nuisance Act remains in the state's anti-
obscenity arsenal. "' This statute bears scrutiny for two reasons. First,
as the state's only tool for controlling obscenity, it may be extensively
employed. Second, the Act's potential for abuse by both private in-
dividuals and by the state poses a threat of harassment due to the Act's
lack of procedural safeguards and its severe sanctions.
In the statute, a nuisance is defined as
any place in. . . which lewdness, assignation, or prostitution
is conducted, . . . or upon which lewd, indecent, lascivious,
or obscene films . . . are photographed, . . or shown, and
the personal property. . . used in conducting . . . any such
place.. 28
Establishments falling within this definition are subject to a civil action
for abatement as a public nuisance.29 This action may be brought by the
25. The following persons were subject to criminal liability:
Whoever knowingly sells or lends, or offers to sell or lend, or give away
. . . or has in his possession with, or without intent to sell, . . . any obscene,
lewd, undecent or lascivious book ....
IND. CODE § 35-30-10-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2803 (1956 Repl.); and
[a]ny person, whether or not he is a citizen of this state, who knowingly
sends or causes to be sent into this state, any obscene, lewd, indecent, or las-
civious literature .
IND. CODE § 35-30-10-3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2803a (1956 Repl).
The Indiana juvenile obscenity statutes, IND. CoDE §§ 35-30-11-1 to -7 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 10-817 to -823 (Supp. 1973), have never been challenged in a reported
case. These statutes, unlike the adult criminal obscenity statutes, appear consistent with
the Miller requirement of specificity. They prohibit descriptions or representations of
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse or nudity which are harmful
to minors. The definition of "harmful to minors" parallels the earlier standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). IND.
CODE §§ 35-30-11-1 (C), (d), (e), (b), (f) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-817(c), (d),
(e), (b), (f) (Supp. 1973).
26. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
27. The 1974 General Assembly adjourned without enacting a new criminal ob-
scenity statute. The Senate tabled a compromise bill because some senators felt the state
would be better off with no law than an ineffective one. Indianapolis Star, Feb. 15,
1974, at 6, cols. 7-8.
28. IN . CODE § 35-30-10.5-1 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2711 (Supp. 1973).
29. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2713 (Supp. 1973). In-
terestingly, the new Indiana act does not appear to include bookstores within its defini-
tions even though Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), a companion case to
Miller, held that words, even absent pictorial illustration, may be obscene. Id. at 118-20.
The omission, however, is understandable since criminal obscenity statutes were in force
when the act was passed.
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state Attorney General, the county prosecuting attorney or by any private
citizen residing in the same county as the alleged nuisance. To reduce
the possibility of harassment, the private citizen must post a $1000
bond to insure good faith. Should he or she prevail at the trial, the
plaintiff may recover reasonable attorney's fees."
After filing, the plaintiff may apply for a temporary injunction
pendente lite. While an adversary hearing must be held within ten days
of the application, the court may issue an ex parte restraining order to
preserve any evidence and prevent its removal from the court's juris-
diction. If the defendant, having been notified at least five days in ad-
vance, requests a continuance, the temporary injunction is automatically
issued."'
The temporary injunction restrains the defendant, and any other
persons, from continuing the alleged nuisance.3 In addition, the court
issues an order closing the establishment until the final hearing, unless
the owners of the real and personal property satisfy the court that certain
criteria have been met: (a) bond has been posted, (b) the nuisance is
abated and will not be re-established, and (c) they were unaware of the
use of their property as a nuisance and that even with reasonable care
and diligence, such use could not have been known.33
If the plaintiff prevails and a nuisance is established, a permanent
injunction is issued against both the establishment and the defendant.
The personal property used in conducting the nuisance will be removed
and sold; obscene material will be confiscated and destroyed. The final
order closes the establishment for one year, unless sooner released. 4
Vhenever a permanent injunction issues, a "tax" of $300 is im-
posed on both the nuisance and the owner. If the defendant is found in-
nocent or has permanently abated the nuisance in good faith, this "tax"
is not collected.3"
30. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-3 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2713 (Supp. 1973).
31. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2714 (Supp. 1973).
32. Id.
33. Id. Testimony pertaining to the general reputation of the place is prima facie
evidence of the existence of the nuisance and of the knowledge, acquiescence and par-
ticipation by the defendant. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2715
(Supp. 1973). The conviction of the defendant in a related criminal proceeding is con-
clusive proof against that defendant as to the existence of the nuisance. IND. CODE § 35-
30-10.5-10 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2720 (Supp. 1973).
34. IND. CODE §§ 35-30-10.5-5, -6 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-2715, -2716 (Supp.
1973). The closing order may be released by following a similar procedure to the
temporary injunction release in § 3 of the Act. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-3 (1973), IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-2713 (Supp. 1973).
35. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-8 (1973), IND. AN. STAT. § 9-2718 (Supp. 1973).
324
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DEFECTS IN THE INDIANA PORNOGRAPHIC NUISANCE ACT
A state may constitutionally declare any place kept and maintained
for an illegal purpose a common nuisance." The theory behind state
control rests on the fact that public nuisances produce a common damage.
This damage may include intangible injuries resulting from the immoral,
indecent and unlawful acts which become nuisances by their deleterious
influence on the morals of society. 7 In order to protect society, the state
police power has been held the source of an equitable right to abate public
nuisances.38 This right includes the power to destroy private property."9
Although disagreement exists among state courts on the constitu-
tionality of nuisance statutes to suppress obscene materials,4" a number
of states utilize nuisance actions in place of criminal proceedings' because
equity affords greater efficiency and speed. But, sensitive tools must be
employed when state power is directed against recognized forms of ex-
pression 2 and motion pictures have been held to be protected by the first
amendment.43 The Indiana Pornographic Nuisance Act may be too crude
a tool to regulate the first amendment rights of theatre owners and the
viewing public.
Inadequate Safeguards in Preliminary Injunction Proceedings
The issuance of a preliminary injunction utilizes a devastating
power which should be employed only in the exceptional case,44 but be-
cause of the lack of safeguards in the Indiana Act, it may be used indis-
criminately. The Act requires the court to issue the temporary injunc-
tion if the petition's allegations are sustained to its satisfaction."' While
other jurisdictions require that statutory criteria for the issuance of a
36. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658, 669 (1887).
37. H. WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 14 (2d ed. 1893). See also W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 86, 88 (4th ed. 1971).
38. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878) ; Carleton v. Rugg, 149
Mass. 550, 555, 22 N.E. 55, 56 (1889).
39. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658 (1887).
40. Grove Press Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 88 (3d Cir. 1969) (public nuis-
ance may be used to restrain conduct specifically prohibited by other constitutionally
appropriate standards) ; Oregon Bookmark Corp. v. Schrunk, 321 F. Supp. 639 (D. Ore.
1970) (nuisance regulation held inconsistent with first amendment) ; Harmer v. Tonylyn
Productions, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 943, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576, 577 (1972).
41. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4711-:4717 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3767.01-.11 (Page 1971).
42. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
43. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
44. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1940).
45. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2714 (Supp. 1973).
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temporary injunction supercede common law criteria,46 Indiana leaves
the issuance of the injunction to the judge's discretion.47 In the absence
of statutory guidelines, the Indiana judge must still utilize the classic
common law criteria.4 These include: (1) the irreparability of harm
to the plaintiff pendente lite,"5 (2) the balance of the potential harm to
each party,"0 and (3) the public interest.5 Applying these criteria to
an obscenity case, it is doubtful the plaintiff can successfully satisfy them.
First, the plaintiff usually cannot demonstrate that he or she suffers
irreparable harm. Only those persons who voluntarily pay the admission
price are exposed to the potential harm of a film. While some have
argued that drive-in theatres inadvertantly subject passers-by to the
harms of questionable material,52 an otherwise unobjectionable film does
not necessarily become obscene in the "context of its exhibition."53 Thus,
unless a general, irreparable harm can be shown to stem from the pres-
ence of the film or the theatre in the locality, it will be difficult for a
plaintiff to meet the irreparable harm criterion.
Second, the potential harm of the temporary injunction to the de-
fendant often substantially outweighs the harm to the plaintiff. Restrain-
ing the exhibition of a film, even for one week, may have drastic
economic repercussions on the defendant. 4 Also, since most films are
46. State v. O.K. Transfer Co., 215 Ore. 8, 14-15, 330 P.2d 510, 513 (1958). In this
case, involving the violation of a criminal statute, the court held that the requirement
that the plaintiff make a "proper showing" did not include the need to meet the common
law standards of irreparable harm and inadequacy of a legal remedy. Id.
47. E.g., Tuf-Tread Corp. v. Kilborn, 202 Ind. 154, 157, 172 N.E. 353, 354 (1930).
48. Although one of the traditional common law requirements for the issuance of a
temporary injunction is the probability of the plaintiff's success on the merits, J. HIGr,
A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCrION § 5 (4th ed. 1905), in Indiana a plaintiff need
only make out a prima facie case. State e.x rel. Haberkorn v. DeKalb Circuit Court, 251
Ind. 283, 291, 241 N.E.2d 62, 67 (1968).
49. Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 180 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1950);
Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963). "A lawful business may be
so conducted as to become a nuisance, but, in order to warrant interference by injunc-
tion, the injury must be a material and essential one." Owen v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 284,
288 (1881).
50. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740, 743 (2d Cir.
1953), Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1950).
51. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1953).
52. In an Indiana case, a municipal ordinance applied against a licensed drive-in
was held unconstitutional. Cinecom Theatres Midwest States Inc. v. Fort Wayne, 473
F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973). The court stated that although brief exposure to a film is
inevitable, in the absence of a showing that the presentation is too obtrusive to be avoided
by passers-by, the plaintiff's alleged privacy interest could not support such sweeping
legislation. Id. at 1303.
53. Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1972).
54. Some theatres may receive gross revenue in excess of $20,000 for one week's
exhibition. See, e.g., Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 460 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (more
than 7,000 patrons saw the film "Vixen" in the week following the injunction of state
proceedings).
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leased for a short period, a temporary injunction, even if dissolved, may
effectively prohibit a film's exhibition in a certain area.5  The plaintiff
will find it difficult to assert an interest which will override the hard-
ship which a temporary injunction would inflict on the defendant.
Third, the judge must consider the public interest before issuing
an injunction. The public has the right, supported by the first amend-
ment, to view motion pictures which are not obscene. A temporary in-
junction could effectively prevent large numbers of potential viewers
from ever seeing films that a few have asserted to be obscene."
The Absence of Jury Participation
By labeling the nuisance proceedings equitable, the Indiana Act
may eliminate the use of a jury in an obscenity trial. Although it has
been held that a jury determination of obscenity is not required in an
equity proceeding, Miller suggests that:
In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law,
we must continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied by
the safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of
innocence, and other protective features provide, as we do with
rape, murder, and a host of other offenses against society and
its individual members.5
In a post-Miller case, the federal government argued that "only an Iowa
jury can properly apply 'Iowa community standards.'
On the other hand, the same day as Miller was decided, the United
55. Some films are leased for ten days to two weeks. Since the Indiana Act allows
for ten days between the temporary injunction and the final hearing, the theatre owner
may not be able to extend his lease. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965);
Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 467 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
56. Although the Act provides for an adversary hearing within ten days after a
petition for a temporary injunction is filed, the act also provides that an injunction shall
issue as a matter of course if the hearing is continued at the defendant's request. INn.
CODE, § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2714 (Supp. 1973). This provision
penalizes, without a hearing, legitimate requests for delay. Thus, without a hearing on
the merits of the nuisance action, a procedural request may suppress a constitutionally
protected film. Although the United States Supreme Court recently held there is no
absolute right to a prior adversary hearing before seizure of allegedly obscene materials
in Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973), the film was neither enjoined from ex-
hibition nor threatened with destruction. In Indiana, however, much more is at stake.
Should the film be found to be obscene, the theatre owner may be enjoined from, show-
ing any film until the final hearing. Im. CODE § 35-30-10.5-6 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-2716 (Supp. 1973).
57. Star v. Preller, 352 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1972). There is no constitutional
infirmity in determining obscenity in an equity proceeding as long as the constitutional
safeguards of notice and fair hearing are provided. Id. at 539.
58. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
59. United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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States Supreme Court held that a jury trial is not required in state civil
obscenity proceedings."' That case, however, involved an action under a
Virginia statute61 directed against obscene materials themselves, rather
than against individual defendants. Massachusetts, which has a statute
similar to Virginia's, allows any person interested in the sale, loan or
distribution of the book to demand a jury trial on the issue of obscenity.6 2
Moreover, at common law the question of nuisance was decided by a jury
trial before an injunction issued.63 Therefore, the Court's affirmance of
the Virginia statute should not be read as approving statutes, such as
Indiana's, which subject individ-uals to penalties without a jury trial.
Some have argued that a jury determination of obscenity is incon-
sistent with an objective first amendment standard. 4 However, a jury
is designed to represent a cross section of the community, and therefore
is especially well-suited to reflect the views of the average citizen.6 5 Since
a case would not go to the jury if the judge found the material not obscene
as a matter of law, a jury could provide a theatre owner with additional
protection.66
Thus, under the Indiana statute, because the action is directed
against the theatre and its owner, a jury trial would provide needed
safeguards, even if not constitutionally required.
Vagueness
The Pornographic Nuisance Act provides* for proceedings against
any establishment where "lewd, indecent, lascivious, or obscene" films
are shown. This wording makes the statute unconstitutionally vague.
The standard employed requires that a statute not be "so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. '68
Statutes which are vague are declared void on constitutional
grounds because they do not provide "sufficiently definite warning as
60. Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.3 (1950).
62. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 28D (1968).
63. 2 3. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 923 (13th ed. 1886). Contra, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
673 (1887).
64. See, e.g., Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518,
527 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan].
65. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
66. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 531.
67. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-1 (1973), IND. ANN STAT. § 9-2711 (Supp. 1973).
68. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ; see Note, Tile Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
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to the proscribed conduct."69 The prominence which obscenity litigation
has gained attests to the difficulty which courts, as well as "men of
common intelligence," have in defining standards such as those found
in the Indiana statutes. 0
In addition, the Indiana statute does not meet the Miller test which
requires that the proscribed conduct be specifically described.71 Miller
requires the specific description of "patently offensive 'hard core' sexual
conduct" in order to "provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials."72
Language identical to the Pornographic Nuisance Act was used in the
criminal obscenity statutes recently held unconstitutional by the Indiana
Supreme Court in light of Miller."3 Furthermore, even though some
Indiana cases have indicated that vague statutory language may be saved
by presuming that the legislature intended to follow the prevailing con-
stitutional standard of obscenity,74 the Miller decision appears to have
foreclosed this approach."5
Prior Restraint
Besides an injunction, the Act provides that the court may issue an
order closing the theatre for one year, unless sooner released." This
closing order places a prior restraint on first amendment freedoms.
In Near v. Minnesota,7 7 a newspaper was enjoined as a nuisance,
from further publication of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory"
material." The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
purpose of the statute was not punishment, but suppression of first
amendment rights. 9
Although some prior restraint may be necessary to effectuate the
state's obscenity statutes,"0 the closing power of the Indiana Act is too
extensive. It allows the courts to close the theatre for a year even when
69. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957) (dicta); United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (dicta).
70. Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertaint--An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195,
222 (1955).
71. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
72. Id. at 27.
73. Mohney v. State, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 66 (1973) ; Stroud v. State,
Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973).
74. E.g., Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 69 (N.D. Ind. 1969) ; Stroud v. State.
- Ind. -, 273 N.E.2d 842, 844-45 (1971).
75. 413 U.S. at 24; see text accompanying note 18 supra.
76. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-6 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2716 (Supp. 1973).
77. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
78. Id. at 701.
79. Id. at 711.
80. See, e.g., Delta Book Distrib. Inc. v. Cranvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. La.
1969).
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no evidence exists that obscene films may be exhibited there in the
future. In the context of books, it has been held:
If the enjoining of future issues of a publication is impermis-
sible, then enjoining complete use of the press and the building
is much more impermissible, for that results in no future issues
of any publication, and not only the unprotected obscene."
Similarly, a theatre owner may not only suffer serious economic reper-
cussions, but also may lose his or 'her first amendment right to show all
films.
Chilling Effect
The Indiana Act also imposes a "chilling effect" on the exercise of
first amendment rights by theatre owners. This term was coined by the
Supreme Court to describe the inhibition of the exercise of first amend-
ment rights by statutes which are overbroad in their sweep or imprecise
in their language.82
Any prosecution under a statute regulating expression involves im-
ponderables which may inhibit first amendment freedoms.8 3 However,
When the statute is overbroad or vague, the chilling effect on these rights
becomes critical.8" Under the Indiana Act, if a court finds a theatre has
shown an obscene film, the theatre and its owner will be perpetually en-
joined from maintaining a nuisance.8 Both the injunction and the
threat thereof have a chilling effect on theatre owners, because it does
not warn them which films are prohibited.86 Moreover, the chilling
effect may be intensified because the trial judge retains the power to
summarily try and punish the defendant for violations of the injunction.87
Further, this provision is inconsistent with the jury preference in
Miller.88 Thus, in attempting to comply with the statute and the court
order, a theatre owner would hesitate to schedule any films which could
81. Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876, 881 (La. App.
1972). See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
82. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
83. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
84. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
85. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2715 (Supp. 1973).
86. A number of courts have emphasized the need for specificity in order to give
adequate notice of proscribed conduct in first amendment cases. Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965) ; Mitchem v. State ex -el. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971), citing
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Because an injunction may place an un-
acceptable burden on one's freedom to sell publications, a publication which is to be sup-
pressed must be specifically named. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 735
(1961).
87. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-7 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2717 (Supp. 1973).
88. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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be- considered objectionable. Fearing judicial action, he or she will volun-
tarily restrict the theatre's offerings, even to the point of refusing to
show protected films.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR INDIANA
Several alternatives remain available if Indiana wishes to control
the distribution of obscene materials. First, the state could decide to
leave control to the local communities. This approach would recognize
the "community standards" formulation of Miller, and bring control
more closely in line with local thinking."9 Some Indiana localities have
adopted municipal ordinances to control obscene materials. Evansville
acted prior to Miller, passing an ordinance which follows the language
of the Indiana juvenile statutes." Indianapolis enacted an ordinance
which incorporated the Miller guidelines.9 ' While these ordinances do
not resolve all of the difficulties inherent in obscenity control- legislation,
they nevertheless appear constitutional.
Second, the state could decide merely to codify the Miller guidelines
in a specific statute which was not subject to the usual constitutional
objections. 2 This statute would allow differing applications in different
areas due to different formulations of local standards. The General As-
sembly would have to be careful in drafting such a statute to leave room
for these local differences, while not being impermissibly vague or over-
broad.
Third, the state might decide to stay out of the obscenity control
arena entirely."3 Public pressure might then be substituted for state con-
trol of obscenity. Under this approach, the market place would control
the supply of obscene material within a given area.94 If the prevailing
community standards oppose obscene material, then the pressure created
by a low demand would force the materials and those who offered them
out of the community. Even if there were high demand, political and
89. See note 20 supra & text accompanying.
90. Evansville, Ind., Ordinance G-72-13, April 5, 1972. The Indiana Juvenile
Statutes are codified at IND. CoDE §§ 35-30-11-1 to -7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-817
to -823 (Supp. 1973).
91. Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance 46, October 16, 1973.
92. In Miller, the court offered two examples of statutory language which would
satisfy the requirement of specificity. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
93. "The States, of course, may follow such a 'laissez faire' policy and drop all
controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what they prefer .... " Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973).
94. If the magazines in question were truly "patently offensive" to the local
community, there would be no need to ban them through the exercise of the
police power; they would be banned by the marketplace which provided no
buyers for them.
Trinkler v. Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265, 266 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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social pressure might be used by anti-obscenity forces to lower the de-
mand. This approach would support the view of some that obscenity
is incapable of definition but is merely a matter of taste and social
custom. 5
Finally, since it is doubtful that the state will leave the obscenity
control arena, a more neutral procedure could be adopted. Before bring-
ing a civil or criminal action against a dealer in obscene materials, the
state could provide for a declaratory judgment action against the specific
material alleged to be obscene. 6 A finding that it was obscene could
then result in punishment of any person who subsequently distributed
it in the community. Each offense after a determination of obscenity
could be punished separately, thus obviating the need to resort to in-
junction. In this manner, potential defendants would be put on notice
of their illegal conduct, and only specific violations would be punished."
CONCLUSION
The recent obscenity decisions have had a noticeable effect on anti-
obscenity prosecutions. Thinking that the Court has returned the power
that previous decisions had limited, state and local governments are
taking bold actions against allegedly obscene materials.98
95. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 491-92 (1965) ; see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
96. Massachusetts and Virginia have such procedures. MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 272,
§ 28C (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.3 (1950).
97. The President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography has suggested this
procedure be adopted:
The Commission recommends the enactment, in all jurisdictions which en-
act or retain provisions prohibiting the dissemination of sexual materials to
adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing prosecutors to obtain declara-
tory judgments as to whether particular materials fall within existing legal pro-
hibitions ....
A declaratory judgment procedure . . . would permit prosecutors to pro-
ceed civilly, rather than through the criminal process, against suspected viola-
tions of obscenity prohibition. If such civil procedures are utilized, penalties
would be imposed for violation of the law only with respect to conduct occurring
after a civil declaration is obtained. The Commission believes this course of
action to be appropriate whenever there is an existing doubt regarding the legal
status of materials; where other alternatives are available, the criminal process
should not ordinarily be invoked against persons who might have reasonably
believed, in good faith, that the books or films they distributed were entitled to
constitutional protection, for any threat of criminal sanctions might otherwise
deter the free distribution of constitutionally protected material.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 63 (1970). Justice Douglas in his dissent in
Miller also suggested this procedure. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42-44 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 1, 1973, § D, at 1, col. 6; Keating, Green Light to
Combat Smut. READERS DIGEST, Jan. 1974, at 147. Perhaps the states overreacted and
misinterpreted the Miller guidelines. The Supreme Court has agreed to clarify its deci-
sion. Jenkins v. Georgia, 42 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1973).
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With the exception of the juvenile statutes, the Pornographic
Nuisance Act is the only Indiana statute left to combat obscenity. As-
suredly, it will be declared unconstitutional as were -the criminal obscenity
statutes. Even if the vague language is clarified, the nuisance act is too
imprecise a tool to regulate obscenity. The state's legitimate interest in
barring obscene materials does not outweigh the individual's interest in
exercising first amendment rights with a clear knowledge of what
materials and actions are outside the Constitution's protection. Indiana
has available several alternatives which would allow both interests to be
effectuated.
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